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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant is a Utah corporation which publishes and markets 
books and tapes and conducts seminars in the field of real estate. (Testimony 
of Richard B. Weeks, Formal Hearing Transcript at 8-0). 
2. Appellant uses direct mail advertising as a marketing 
technique to contact potential customers and to invite them to seminars and 
conferences. (Weeks at 9.) 
3. The appellant leases mailing lists Containing names and 
addresses from various mailing list brokerage companies. The brokerage 
companies do not own the lists, but rather they havfc access to the raw lists 
of names through the owners' permission. (Weeks at 14.) 
4. The brokerage companies compiled th£ lists of names and 
addresses to be leased to the appellant by narrowing the raw lists according 
to certain "selects" or characteristics such as geographic areas, gender, 
income bracket, home ownership, magazines purchased, and number of children. 
(Testimony of Thomas M. Tolman, Formal Hearing Transcript at 30.) The number 
and the type of the "selects" chosen varied according to the appellant's needs 
and desires. (Tolman at 29 and 31.) Most brokerage companies have access to 
the same raw lists (Tolman at 28.); and other companies, even those not 
involved in real estate, could lease the same lists with the same selects. 
(Tolman at 91.) 
5. Appellant received the mailing li^ts in two forms. 
Approximately forty percent (40%) (Weeks at 14.) 6f the names and addresses 
were transferred via magnetic computer tapes from which the company prepared 
mailing lists on its own word processing equipment. (Weeks at 12.) The 
remaining sixty percent (60%) (Weeks at 14.) of the names and addresses 
appeared on typed lists which the appellant gummed and then cut up into labels 
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to be attached directly to the materials mailed. (Weeks at 12.) Each list, 
whether on tape or paper, was used only once according to the agreements 
between the brokerage companies and the appellant. (Weeks at 12 and 13.) 
Depending upon the instructions from the mailing list brokers, the appellant 
was required to either return or destroy each computer tape after the one use. 
(Weeks at 12.) 
6. Each lease of the lists constituted a single transaction where 
the cost was determined by the value of the lists. (Tolman at 53.) There was 
no separate fee for the broker services (Tolman at 49, 84, 85.), although the 
lists' values could reflect the brokers' greater or lesser expenditure of time 
and effort. (Tolman at 29 and 62.) 
7. The mailing lists on magnetic computer tapes were subjected to 
a merge-purge function by the appellant following their receipt from the 
broker companies. The merge-purge operated to combine the lists and to 
eliminate duplications in the names (Tolman at 102.) 
8. Appellant claims that the rentals of the mailing lists were 
not subject to use tax because the lists are intangible and because the 
transactions involved payments for services. (Weeks at 19 and 20.) 
9. For the audit period from July 1, 1979, through June 30, 1982, 
the Utah State Tax Commission assessed a use tax of $19,711.21 plus penalties 
and interest. The appellant is requesting that approximately $7,750.00 of the 
use tax deficiency be abated. All of the penalty has been abated and is not 
at issue before this court. The use tax was assessed on the rentals by the 
appellant of $154,844.10 worth of mailing lists. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Supreme Court should review the district court's judgment 
in this tax commission review proceeding on the same basis as other judgments. 
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2. The acquisitions of the mailing lists were purchases of 
tangible personal property, not the uses of services!. 
3. The use of the mailing lists are us^s of tangible personal 
property taxable under Utah use tax statutes. 
4. The legislature couched U.C.A. 59-l$-3 in broad, general terms 
in order to afford the tax commission great latitude in administering the 
statute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN THIS TAX 
REVIEW PROCEEDING ON THE SAME BASI 
JUDGMENTS 
COMMISSION 
(S AS OTHER 
In Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Sta(te Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 
397 (Utah 1980) this court stated: 
The review by this Court of the judgment of the 
district court in these tax commission review 
proceedings is on the same basis as other judgments: 
they are entitled to the presumptions of verity; the 
burden is upon appellant to show there was error; and 
this Court will not reverse unless the findings are 
without substantial support in the evidence, or there 
was error in law... 
Appellant argues that since the partie$ stipulated that the formal 
hearing transcript and exhibits constituted a fulli record, this Court should 
consider the matter de novo. Appellant relies on [Sacramento Baseball Club, 
Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 105$ (Utah 1987) Sacramento 
Baseball holds, in pertinent part, that when a trial court relies on 
stipulated facts to decide the case, "this court (joes not apply the clearly 
erroneous standard, but will sustain the lower court's decision only if 
convinced of its correctness...Thus we examine the facts de novo." Id at 
1060. 
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The ruling in Sacramento Baseball does not apply to the case at 
bar because the tax division of the district court was not functioning in the 
role of a trial court. Instead, it conducted a de novo review on the record 
of a tax commission decision pursuant to U.C.A. 59-1-603. U.C.A. 59-1-603 
(repealed effective December 31, 1987) required the district court to conduct 
de novo review of "appeals from and petitions for review of decisions of the 
commission..." The type of review contemplated by the statute was a "trial 
upon the record made before the lower tribunal without the submission of new 
testimony. The purpose of the de novo requirement was to signify that the 
scope of the court's review of the record would include a fresh consideration 
of questions of fact as well as questions of law." Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 
45 (Utah 1981). 
The district court conducted a complete trial de novo on the 
record, issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The stipulation of 
the parties merely certified the tax commission's record upon which the 
district court's review was based. 
The Sacramento Baseball rule is further inapplicable because its 
rationale does not pertain. The rule is based on the premise that when a 
district court relies on stipulated facts, it lacks the opportunity to observe 
the witnesses and hear their testimony. See Prince v. W. Empire Life Ins. 
Co., 19 Utah 2d 174, 428 P.2d 163 (1967). In the case at bar, the trier of 
fact was the tax commission. The commissioners who heard the case had ample 
opportunity to see and hear the witnesses as well as to cross examine them. 
POINT II 
THE ACQUISITIONS OF THE MAILING LISTS WERE 
NOT THE USES OF SERVICES 
To be taxable under §59-16-3 of the Utah Code Ann., the item used 
must be tangible personal property. Except for specific services outlined in 
§59-16-3(b), there is no tax on the use of services. The fact that the 
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mailing lists were leased for a one time use, rather than purchased, does not 
affect the question of whether there were uses of services or property. When 
a lessee has the right to possession, operation, or use of tangible personal 
property, then the use tax applies to the amount pai^ J pursuant to the lease 
agreement, regardless of the duration of the agreement. Utah State Tax 
Commission Rule A12-02-S32(b). As the court said in Comptroller of the 
Treasury 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983): "It is said each tape is used 
only once. But a dress pattern purchased at retail and used to make only one 
dress (or even if never used) is taxable." JUL at £61. 
Both the computer tapes and the typed lists can be treated the 
same in the determination of whether the appellant was paying for services or 
for property when it rented the mailing lists. Thel use of both the computer 
tapes and the typed lists is either the use of property or the use of 
services. The issue here is one of property versusi services rather than 
tangible property versus intangible property. 
In determining whether a transaction i$ for property or for 
service, courts usually focus on the essence of th^ transaction or, in other 
words, the real and true object of the transaction^ Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. 
Director, Division of Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 175, 440 A.2d 104 (1981). The 
Supreme Court of Ohio, recognizing that most transactions involve a mixed 
degree of personal service and of transfer of tangible personal property, 
articulated the test as whether the real object sought by the buyer is the 
service per se or the property produced by the service. Accountants Computer 
Services, Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 120, 29$ N.E.2d 519 (1973). 
Once the dominant or primary purpose is decided, then the 
transaction is characterized as a single overall function, either the rental 
or purchase of equipment or the provision of services. Comptroller of the 
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Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co.f 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983). Factors to 
be considered in determining the dominant purpose are as follows: (1.) 
whether the service involved was consequential or inconsequential to the 
conveyance of the tangible personal property; (2.) whether there was a 
separate charge for the service in addition to the charge for the products; 
(3.) whether the purchaser or renter acquired a tangible personal property 
interest; and (4.) whether the value of the product was temporary or 
transitory. 
The appellant contends that the objects of its transactions with 
the mailing list companies were the services provided and that the rentals of 
the actual mailing lists were incidental and inconsequential to those 
services. The appellant claims that the service aspect far outweighs the 
value of the final products. However, such an argument is analogous to 
ordering a particular cake, relying on the baker1s help and expertise in 
deciding what kind and how much, and then claiming that the baker's services 
were the object of the purchase, with the cake existing only as an incidental 
element. 
Just as one makes a one time "use" of a cake by eating it, the 
appellant made a one time use of the mailing lists by using them. The 
services would have been meaningless without the mailing lists as the final 
products. What the appellant wanted and used were the names and addresses as 
they were delivered in tangible personal property form. The fact that the 
tapes and the paper cost little by themselves does not convert activities from 
the acquisitions of property into the acquisitions of services. 
Recent court decisions deal with this issue in a realistic and 
practical manner. Old West Realty, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 110 
Id. 546, 716 P.2d 1318 (1986), involved a multiple listing service which 
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distributed monthly multiple listing booklets to saljesmen who subscribed to 
the service. The Idaho Supreme Court found that thq taxpayer failed to 
establish his entitlement to an exemption from the general sales taxing 
authority, although the transactions were admittedly mixed ones of services 
and property. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the objects of 
the sales were the services rendered. Instead, thejcourt held that the 
transactions were taxable ones involving the transfers of the booklets which 
were defined as tangible personal property. 
Even where services are the dominant elbment in a transaction, 
courts have found that the real object test may point to the final product as 
the essence of the transaction. In Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487 
A.2d 124 (R.I. 1985), a toy manufacturing company hired an art company to 
design and construct packaging for a new toy. The court found that, although 
there were considerable expertise and effort invested in producing the package 
and that the effort exceeded the component value of the resulting tangible 
personal property, the transfer of the personal property was not incidental to 
the service rendered. The Rhode Island Court, quoting Community Telecasting 
Service v. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500, 503 (Me. 1966), stated: "'The fact that 
property the subject of a sale is custom made and that labor is the principal 
cost factor does not establish the contract as on^ for rendition of services 
rather than sale.,n The court held that the real object of the transaction 
was the end product of the mechanical artwork froqi which to fabricate the toy 
package. 
In this case, the appellant sought to gain access to the mailing 
lists. The focus and goal of the transactions wefe the uses of the names and 
addresses. While it appears to be true that the brokers offered advice and 
expertise based on past experience, the services provided were incidental to 
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the end products. (This is particularly true where the appellant in the 
instant case applied further services to the tapes after acquiring them; the 
merge-purge activities took place.) See Citizens Financial Corp. v. Kosydar, 
43 Ohio St. 2d, 331 N.E.2d 435 (1975), where the court held that the object of 
the transaction was a hard-copy printout of the information. 
There was no separate charge for the services in the instant case. 
Appellant did not pay for the services; it paid to obtain and to use the 
mailing lists. 
When the appellant rented the lists from the list brokerage 
companies, it acquired a tangible property interest because Mark 0. Haroldsen, 
Inc. could then use the lists and apply the information for its own purposes. 
See Cowdrey, Software and Sales Tax: The Illusory Intangible, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 
181 (1983) (purchaser acquires a tangible personal property interest where 
primary purpose is to use a computer program from the user's own application). 
It is irrelevant to the acquisition of a property interest that 
the rental entitled the appellant to only a one-time use of the names and 
addresses. The use tax is imposed regardless of how many times the property 
is used. The fact of one use does not change transactions for property into 
transactions for services. Towne-Oller and Associates v. State Tax 
Commission, 120 A.D.2d 873, 502 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1986). In Towne, the plaintiff 
rented computer time from Universal, a computer renting company, which, for a 
designated fee, allowed plaintiff's employees to go over to the company and to 
use their computers. The court held that plaintiff's use of computer time was 
taxable because it was a transfer of possession, even though Universal had the 
power to cease plaintiff's use at any time. 
Courts sometimes distinguish between canned and custom software 
programs on the basis that custom-made programs essentially involve services 
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and may therefore be nontaxable. See First National Bank of Fort Worth v» 
Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 
143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983)- However, this line of analysis appears 
arbitrary and weak when viewed in the light of recent court decisions which 
have taken a more practical view. See the earlier discussion and particularly 
Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487 A.2d 124 (R.jl. 1985). Whether the 
taxpayer purchases a program "off the shelf" or commissions a program to be 
custom-made, the real object of the transaction is the acquisition of the 
program. 
Even if custom-made programs are considered nontaxable, the 
exemption for customization is inapplicable to the tase at bar. The appellant 
did not purchase customized lists from the list brokerage companies. The 
brokers did not create the lists of names; they merely narrowed the lists down 
to specific areas chosen by the appellant such as geographic area, zip code 
area, or income level. Although the lists may hav^ been altered or adapted to 
the appellants specifications, they are not "customized" mailing lists. 
Comptroller v. Eguitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 4$4 A.2d 248, 250-54 (1983). 
Customers frequently order products with certain specifications, such as a 
flavor of cake, a type of flower, or a color of clothing. However, these 
preferences do not render the products "custom-mad^." The brokers merely 
rearranged the forms of the raw lists of names. S£e Accountants Computer 
Services, Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 120, 298j N.E. 2d 519 (1973). 
POINT III 
THE USES OF THE MAILING LISTS A^E USES OF 
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXABLE UNDER 
UTAH USE TAX STATUTES! 
Utah Code Ann. §59-16-3 (1983 Supp.) Imposes an excise or use tax 
on "[t]he storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible 
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personal property." To be taxable under this section, there must be use of 
tangible personal property. By implication, there is no tax on intangible 
property. With the exception of specified services as outlined in Utah Code 
Ann. §59-16-3(b), there is no tax on the use of services. Therefore, if the 
property in a transaction is tangible personal property, then a tax is 
imposed. This is true unless the transaction was actually for a nontaxable 
service, and any transfer of tangible property was incidental to that service. 
The two elements are separate and independent requirements for taxation. 
The fact that the mailing lists were rented or leased, rather than 
purchased, does not affect the question of whether there was a use of services 
or of tangible personal property. Under Utah Code Ann. §59-16-3(c) (1983 
Supp.), tangible personal property leased or rented is specifically subject to 
use tax. 
The Utah definition of tangible personal property is premised upon 
the traditional concept of tangible property, i.e., anything that can be 
possessed is an object of tangible property. Utah State Tax Commission Rule 
A12-02-S26 provides as follows: 
Tangible personal property embraces all goods, wares, 
merchandise, produce, and commodities, all tangible or 
corporeal things and substances which are dealt in or 
capable of being possessed or exchanged. It does not 
include real estate or any interest therein or 
improvements thereon nor does it include bank 
accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, notes and other 
evidence of debt, insurance certificates or policies, 
personal or governmental licenses. The term does not 
include water in pipes, conduits, ditches or 
reservoirs but does include water in bottles, tanks or 
other containers. Tangible personal property includes 
all other physically existing articles or things 
including property severed from real estate. A sales 
or use tax is imposed on the sale of tangible personal 
property. 
In applying the limited traditional concept of tangible property, 
one must conclude that the mailing lists are tangible. They arrived at the 
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appellant's company in the form of magnetic computer tapes or typed sheets of 
paper, both of which are corporeal substances capable of being perceived by 
the senses and of being possessed and exchanged. 
Today, courts realize that the "Doctrine of Tangibility" as 
traditionally stated is a somewhat irrelevant concept developed in an earlier 
time for different purposes. Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of 
Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, , 440 A.2d 104, 1210-21 (1981). 
Consequently, courts and legislatures have endeavoHd to expand the doctrine 
in order to maintain its viability and its applicability. See Martin v. 
Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959) (where invasions of the 
owner plaintiff's land by invisible particles of toxic gas was held to be a 
physical trespass). The Utah definition does not specifically state that 
tangible property is only those objects that can be "perceived by the senses" 
and is, therefore, arguably broader and more modern than more limited 
definitions of other jurisdictions. 
The Utah Supreme Court, recognizing the need to apply the legal 
concept of tangibility in a practical manner, held that the sale of foreign 
and rare coins was subject to state sales tax. Tho|rne and Wilson, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 681 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1984). The Utah court, quoting 
with approval the decision in Scotchman's Coin Shop, Inc. v. Administrative 
Hearing Commission, 654 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), stated "'it is 
important to look beyond legal fictions and academic jurisprudence in order to 
discover the economic realities of the case . . . • '" Thorne, 681 P.2d at 
1238. 
In Thorne, the court looked to the "essence of the transaction" 
and found that the coins were tangible personal property because they were 
"sold for their intrinsic value and their face val^ ie [was] not significant." 
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Id. at 1239. In the case at bar, the magnetic tapes were sold for their 
intrinsic value, the information contained in them; and the value of the tapes 
themselves was insignificant. 
Valuable information on computer tapes is arguably less concrete 
than precious metal within coins; however, the coins had a further value to 
their buyers as a future investment, the worth of which would be determined by 
the worldwide market. "'[W]here . . .they [the coins] are transferred as an 
investment commodity, they become tangible personal property . . . .IM Thorne 
at 1239, quoting with approval the decision in Michigan National Bank v. 
Department of Treasury, 127 Mich. App. 646, , 339 N.W.2d 515, 517 (1983). 
Thus, the value of both the coins and the mailing lists lies in their abstract 
intrinsic qualities which vary in worth according to the market price applied. 
The essence of the transactions in Thorne was to acquire commodities. The 
essence of the transactions here is to acquire a property interest in the 
mailing lists so the lists could be utilized by the appellant. 
Appellant contends that the mailing lists are nontaxable because 
they are the tangible embodiment of intangible information. Appellant argues 
that the tapes and cards are incidental to the transfer of information because 
the information can be transferred by alternative means. As support for its 
arguments, the appellant relies on cases dealing with or analyzing the 
qualities of computer software. 
While it is true that the appellant desired to purchase the 
information on the tapes and typed sheets, the fact does not render the 
transactions nontaxable. To hold otherwise would require separating the 
intangible information from the tangible magnetic tapes and typed lists. 
Inconsistent, unfair, and somewhat ridiculous consequences result 
from separating the value of the tangible medium from the value of the 
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information contained thereon or therein. For example, in Fingerhut Products 
Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minni 1977), the court held 
that the mailing lists typed on sheets of paper were intangible and nontaxable 
while the mailing lists on gummed labels were tangibfle and taxable. Whether 
the names and addresses appeared on paper or on gummed labels, the names and 
addresses were what Fingerhut sought to acquire. Yet, the court drew a 
distinction between the two kinds of physical objects ~ paper and gummed 
labels — on the basis that the gummed labels were Used directly on the 
envelopes while the names on the paper were not "us^d" in their present form. 
Taxability should not depend on separability. Citizens & Southern 
Systems, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717 
(1984). Magnetic tapes containing mailing lists ar^ no different from books, 
records, or video tapes. Their value lies in the matter contained in them and 
generally not in the medium of transfer itself. hi[, 311 S.E.2d at 718. 
The court in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 
296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983), stated that magnetic tapes are tangible 
personal property whose value is enhanced due to thte programs encoded thereon; 
furthermore, a computer tape containing a copy of a| program is no less 
intangible because the content is a reproduction of intellectual effort just 
as a book or record is no less intangible because ilt reproduces artistic 
effort. Magnetic tapes and books have intangible features, but they are 
primarily tangible in nature. (The Comptroller court said that "intangibility 
should not be determined by the extent of use. After all, a book that is read 
only once is and remains tangible personal property." Comptroller, 464 A.2d 
at 255. A book is tangible even if it is not ever read. The Comptroller 
court also noted that "because a taxable transaction might have been 
structured in a nontaxable form, it does not thereby become nontaxable." Jji. 
at 261.) 
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In Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1985), 
the court recognized the inherent abstract nature of computer technology, but 
it refused to define computer software as an intangible object. The court 
stated that although a computer program consists of invisible, inaudible, 
electronic impulses, such impulses do not "simply float in space but are 
conveyed to the computer by way of the software program"; and in this way, the 
"software . . . is no different from other taxable personal property such as 
films, videotapes, books, cassettes, and records." Hasbro, 487 A.2d at 128. 
In each file, videotape, book, cassette, and record, the property's value lies 
in its respective abilities to store and later to display or transmit its 
contents. Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). 
(The Vermont court steadfastly refuses to draw an intangible-tangible 
distinction when applying the definition of tangible personal property to 
computer software tapes and continually finds computer software is tangible 
personal property for sales tax purposes.) 
The New York legislature, recognizing the futility of trying to 
separate the information from the medium to decide taxability, enacted a state 
statute which provides for the direct taxation of sales of information. In 
Skaggs-Walsh, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 120 A.D.2d 786, 501 N.Y.S.2d 520 
(1986), the court held that the sale of a customer list was taxable as a sale 
of information. 
Even without a statute providing for the direct taxation of 
transfers of information, the court in Citizens & Southern Systems, Inc. v. 
South Carolina Tax Commission, 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984), refused to 
accept the argument that computer programs can be separated from the magnetic 
tapes and, thus, should not be subject to taxation. The court stated that 
taxability should not depend on separability. 
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Unfortunately, Utahfs legislature has nc^ t yet created or revised a 
statute which would update the concept of taxable tangible personal property 
in this state. As a result, this court must decide whether to interpret 
Utah's use tax law to encompass modern technology orr whether to continue to be 
tied to an outdated and inappropriate test of tangibility as advocated by the 
taxpayer. 
The most recent and the better reasoned decisions and law review 
articles adopt the more progressive approach. Statutes must be flexible and 
so must the hearing bodies interpreting and applying the statutes to ever 
changing fact patterns. Legislatures do not have t(ie time or the resources to 
amend every law as its meaning and application cornel into question. Many 
courts have found magnetic computer tapes and the information that they carry 
to qualify as tangible personal property with unrevlised statutes. This court 
should do the same. 
Some earlier state court decisions reflect the struggle they 
experienced in deciding whether an object was tangible based upon whether the 
contents could have been transferred by an intangible medium. Some of these 
courts reasoned that since the information contained on the tapes could have 
arrived via telephone or cable transmissions, then the transactions using 
tapes were transfers of intangibles and were not taxable. 
The problem with the "alternative intangible medium transfer" 
analysis is that it ignores realities and practicalities. Computer programs 
are not usually transmitted in alternative forms b0cause of the inconvenience 
and because of the prohibitive costs, although such alternative forms are 
theoretically possible. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 
1976). The information is transferred on magnetic tapes because that is the 
most viable method. In comparison, the information in books could, in theory, 
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be transferred by the authors1 reading the books over the telephone lines to 
the receivers. Taking the analogy further, actors could deliver "movies" by 
traveling and performing at different places. However, such modes of 
transmission are silly and unnecessary since printing presses and films are 
available. It is just as ridiculous to allege that since the mailing list 
companies could have read or sent the names and addresses to the taxpayer over 
the telephone (instead of using the magnetic tapes and typed sheets of paper 
to deliver the information), the mailing lists should be held to be 
intangible. 
Furthermore, the decision of whether to tax a transaction depends 
on what occurred, and not on what might have occurred. Commissioner v. 
National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mining Co., 417 U.S. 134, 148 (1974); Citizens 
& Southern Systems, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 280 S.C. 138, 311 
S.E.2d 717, 719 (1984). The taxability decision is made on the basis of the 
actual facts of the case. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Eguitable Trust Co., 
296 Md. 459, , 464 A.2d 248, 261 (1983). 
A taxpayer must accept the consequences of its choice of medium. 
Citizens & Southern Systems, Inc., 311 S.E.2d at 719; Chittenden Trust Co. v. 
Kingt 143 Vt. 271, , 465 A.2d 1100, 1102 (1983). There is no rationale for 
affording a taxpayer the benefit of a form of transaction it has not chosen. 
Cowdrey, Software and Sales Taxes: The Illusory Intangible, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 
181 (1983). State laws that tax mediums such as books, films, and videotapes 
and yet refuse to tax computer tapes unfairly favor software manufacturers 
over the manufacturers of other products. Comment, Software Taxation: A 
Critical Reevaluation of the Notion of Intangibility, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 859. 
Computer software must possess physical properties such as mass 
and volume to enable the host hardware unit to act in a predetermined manner, 
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much like a paper roll in a player piano. Id^ Thus,) software programs can be 
possessed, sold, created, or stolen. 
Furthermore, the software industry has characterized itself as a 
manufacturer of tangible products. Id. at 868. Through amici curiae briefs 
in patent cases, software manufacturers have urged tfie United States Supreme 
Court to regard software as an apparatus or machine. Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584 (1978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (197k); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63 (1972). Trade publications also refer tb software as a product, 
to its makers as manufacturers, and to its designers! as engineers. 1980 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 869, (quoting D. McGlynn, Distributed Processing and Data 
Communications at 258 (1978); M. Goetz, "The 'What is Software1 Legal Snafu", 
at 3-4 (June 6, 1978) (unpublished paper presented sit the National Computer 
Conference, Anaheim, California, by Martin A. Goetz^ Senior Vice-President of 
Applied Data Research, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey)). Industry experts do not 
consider software to be intangible "information" residing within the hardware. 
They see software as a machine component, similar to electronic circuitry. 
1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 869, (quoting Goetz at 3; Myfers, What is Software? 
Datamation, at 74 (Mar. 1979)). 
An even stronger case can be made for treating the typed lists (as 
compared to the lists on magnetic computer tapes) as tangible personal 
property. Clearly, the typed mailing lists can be classified as "corporeal 
things capable of being possessed or exchanged." The typed labels are 
physical property used by the appellant by placing Ithem directly on the 
circulars it mails. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the paper itself 
would be of little value without the names and addresses on it is irrelevant 
in determining the tangibility of the lists. 
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Moreover, in Fingerhut Products, the case relied on by the 
appellant, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that because the physical 
manifestations of the property (there the gummed labels) were used by 
separating and attaching the labels to the envelopes, they could be taxed as 
tangible personal property. Fingerhut Products, 258 N.W.2d at 610. 
Therefore, even if the computer tapes were found to be intangible, that 
decision would not be dispositive of the tangibility of the typed mailing 
lists. 
All of the mailing lists the appellant rented from the Dependable 
List Company and others were used as tangible personal property. The value of 
the data is entirely dependent upon the existence of the physical medium 
containing the information. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 551 
F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977). Both the magnetic tapes and the typed sheets of 
paper are tangible items. Both are used to transfer information from one 
place to another. 
Endeavoring to separate the data from the medium or to distinguish 
an issue of tangibility between the tapes and the paper would result in faulty 
reasoning and inconsistent analysis. "Consequently, there has been a recent 
trend among state jurisdictions to characterize software, or its transference 
onto a tangible storage form (such as a tape or floppy disk), as tangible and 
therefore subject to sales and use taxes." Barron and Bildzok, Fear of the 
Intangible: A Survey of the Accounting and Tax Issues Confronting the 
Software Industry, 12 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 33, 79 (1986). 
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POINT IV 
THE LEGISLATURE COUCHED U.C.A. 59-16k3 IN GENERAL 
TERMS, IN ORDER TO AFFORD THE TAX COMMISSION 
GREAT LATITUDE IN ADMINISTERING THE STATUTE 
Appellant cites Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22 
Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 (1969) for the proposition that "statutes imposing 
taxes and prescribing tax procedures should generally be construed favorably 
to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority." Builders 450 P.2d 
at 99. However the same decision goes on to state in the next sentence: "Such 
rules, though salutary in proper circumstances, should not be so applied as to 
defeat or obstruct the correct operation and the application of taxing 
procedures. The payment of taxes is burdensome. 6ut the means of relief is 
not to be found in allowing some taxpayers to slip by without paying their 
fair share and thus putting on even greater burden on others.: jjd^ at 99. 
Appellant argues that U.C.A. 59-16-3 i£ ambiguous and should be 
construed in appellant's favor. This argument ignores the fundamental nature 
of the taxing statute at issue. U.C.A. 59-16-3 is a broadly worded piece of 
legislation. It clearly endows the tax commission with great discretion. 
Legislative reasoning behind the statute is quite pimple. It implicitly 
recognizes the impossibility of enumerating all it£ms embodied by the concept 
of tangible personal property. 
CONCLUSION 
The mailing lists at issue are tangible personal property. The 
lists and not the services of the brokers were the primary focus of the 
transactions. While services were involved, they were incidental to the 
acquisitions of the property interests in the tapes and labels. Thus, the 
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transactions for the rentals of the lists were taxable. Respondent 
respectfully asks this Court to affirm the district court's decision. 
DATED this Q day of July, 1988. 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
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